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Abstract
New regulation of EU cohesion policy prescribes ex ante impact eval-
uations. These imply a vision of the working of a process of economic
change. A theory of change based on the concept of equilibrium (which
is a situation in which by definition change is not liable to occur) being
paradoxical, the present article aims at presenting bases and basics of
Amendola’s out-of-equilibrium approach in a perspective that is instru-
mental in the above-referred concrete policy issue. Accordingly, after
reviewing the essentials of John Hicks’ concern with the construction
of an out-of-equilibrium approach, the key concepts at play in Amen-
dola and Ga↵ard’s out-of-equilibrium model are summarized and, after
considering the resulting perspective on policy making, and touching
on EU o cial framework for institutional accounts, the sequence of ac-
counts implicit in the out-of-equilibrium model is eventually derived.
JEL codes: B52, C80, E61, O20.
Keywords: Ex Ante Impact Evaluation, Change, Uncertainty, Sunk
Costs, Liquidity Risk, Coordination, Sequence of Accounts.
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1 Introduction
European Structural and Investment Funds constitute the most important
public source of investment in the European Union. Extensive issues in de-
signing and running policy interventions have cleared the way for important
changes in the understanding and organisation of monitoring and evaluation.
In the current cycle (2014-20), regulation (n.1303/2013, artt. 47-57) drops
emphasis on absorption of funds; focus is on the consistency of a subsidized
interventions contribution in attaining planned outcomes. On that account,
the European Commission plans on building the world biggest archive in
impact evaluations by 2023 (art. 114(2)).
Scheduled evaluations are of ex post, interim, and ex ante character. Ex
post evaluations focus on an impact quantitative dimension so they can be
carried out with that set of econometric techniques1 constituting the so-
called counterfactual approach to impact evaluation. Interim evaluations
are based on ex ante evaluations, which focus on the qualitative structure
of a policy intervention, namely on the ‘how and why’ a policy is expected
to contribute to a given policy objective. Techniques to highlight an in-
tervention logic are nested under the label theory-based approach to impact
evaluation (Evalsed, 2013). Interest in this approach originates in the Barca
Report (Barca, 2009) seventh pillar, namely the need of a greater discipline
in devising policy interventions so involve a learning strategy on their out-
comes. Such a discipline-e↵ect is the kernel of both the so-called place-based
approach to development policy and the current cycle in EU cohesion policy.
Of course, ex ante evaluations imply a vision of the working of a process
of economic change. Mainstream visions pose a number of methodologi-
cal issues essentially due to the fact that they are (directly or indirectly)
based on the concept of ‘equilibrium’. Equilibrium is a situation where no
incentive to revise expectations and plans is produced, so that no impulse
to change unfolds. As it happens, economic change is in the nature of a
learning process, that is a process through which ex ante non-measured
or non-measurable risks are however prudentially considered and sequen-
tially measured. In equilibrium-based approaches, instead, all learning is
deemed either unmeaning (rational expectations) or shocking (adaptive ex-
pectations). Either way, an actual agent’s essentially prudential bearing is
transformed into an abstract attitude to maximize a given variable (essen-
tially utility or profits).
Few among so-called heterodox, or critical, economists have bothered to
subordinate the pars destruens of their work to a pars construens. Some-
one who would ever care to make a registry of such rarae aves should not
fail to mention Mario Amendola. In his joint work with Jean-Luc Gaf-
1Di↵erence-in-di↵erences; propensity score matching; discontinuity design; instrumen-
tal variables. See Evalsed, 2013, ch. 8.
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fard, Amendola has made an important contribution to the perpetuation of
the pioneering research program started by John Hicks in which economic
change is to be analysed as an out-of-equilibrium process. Economists can
hardly pose an objective more heterodox or critical than giving all notion
of equilibrium up. However, geography of the schools in economic thinking
is none of Amendola’s business. On a pure theoretical ground, the burden
of the out-of-equilibrium method begins and ends with the analysis of a
sequential process. Amendola’s key interest is in the statecraft2, instead.
Accordingly, these pages aim at presenting bases and basics of his out-of-
equilibrium (i.e., sequential) approach in a perspective that is instrumental
in a concrete policy issue.
The remainder of the article is thus organized as follows. Sec. 2 re-
views Hicks’ concern with the construction of an out-of-equilibrium ap-
proach. Sec. 3 summarizes the essential concepts at play in Amendola and
Ga↵ard’s out-of-equilibrium model. Sec. 4 synthetically considers the result-
ing perspective on policy making. Touching on EU o cial framework for
institutional accounting, Sec. 5 derives a sequence of accounts implicit in the
out-of-equilibrium model. Sec. 6 concludes.
2 Hicksian bases
I have elsewhere argued that the labyrinthine history of Hicks’ theoreti-
cal production is to be regarded as a sequence of pioneering attempts to
emancipate from the notion of equilibrium ((Bianco, 015a)). Although his
traverse analyses have inspired endeavours to detail more and more precise
conditions for successful convergences to the new steady state, he is utterly
unconcerned about traverse per se. He defends inquiries into conditions
for the convergence to a new steady state until one looks no further than
such a state; yet, ‘I for one am glad to be rid of it’ (Hicks 1977, p. 192,my
it.)3. To him, traverse analysis is as an instrument of exploration for a more
ambitious task: ‘the study of the Impulse that an innovation gives’ (ib.).
The key theoretical function Hicks attaches to innovation is to be under-
stood under the light of his methodological distinction between the ‘single
period theory’ and the ‘continuation theory’. Both apply to the analysis
2Amendola and Ga↵ard have applied their model to a good deal of policy issues. This
strategy was instrumental in criticizing policy myths and solving apparent puzzles. The
gamut of issues the model has been applied to includes: the impact of Keynesian and
Monetarist stabilization policies, the impact of an innovation as opposed to a routine
choice, the impact of an innovation under di↵erent hypotheses on the strength of human
and financial constraints, or under di↵erent monetary regimes, wage regimes, firms’ mark-
ups, and market structures.
3The steady state is irrelevant both as starting and final edge of a process of change.
Not only ‘[o]n the Austrian approach, one can start out of equilibrium straight o↵’ (Hicks
1970, p. 258), but convergence is bound to take so long that ‘before that time had elapsed,
something else (some new exogenous shock) would have occurred’ (Hicks 1977, p. 195).
3
of a process of change assumed to be in the nature of a learning process.
However, learning can be considered either in an ex post or in an ex ante
perspective. In the former case, the object of investigation is an actual
co-ordination failure. Its cause can be determined counterfactually, as the
di↵erence between ex-post results and past expectations. Such a causal de-
termination technique is referred to as single-period theory since it yields
perfectly robust outcomes when applied to one period taken in isolation.
In the ex ante perspective, learning is to be considered as the outcome
a possible coordination failure, instead. That is why, in Hicks’ own words,
the continuation theory is concerned with ‘the e↵ects of the events of a first
period upon the expectations and plans which themselves determine the
events of its successors’ (Hicks 1982, p. 223), i.e., with the ways how possible
mistakes can have an e↵ect on learning and hence on planning. Ex ante costs
of learning (changes in expectations) and planning (changes in plans) are
essential and connected pillars in a liquidity-constrained agent’s behaviour:
since the exhaustion of existing arbitrage opportunities (speculation) entails
a great deal of learning costs, a liquidity constrained agent is compelled to
produce new opportunities. Di↵erently from the analysis of pure arbitrage,
the theory of liquidity-constrained agent’s innovations calls the equilibrium
concept benefits into question.
Equilibrium is a situation in which no endogenous stimulus to innovate
expectations and hence plans is produced. As it happens, in an equilibrium-
based theory ex ante learning costs are not a fundamental issue:
Elementary economic analysis, which culminates in the determination
of the conditions for equilibrium, assumes, when it does deal with
change, that the change has not been foreseen, but that, when it takes
place, everyone can count on the new conditions being maintained.
Such an assumption naturally leads to paradoxes. (Hicks 1932, p. 59)
While via the standard assumption that the opening and the closing po-
sition of a process of change are equilibrium positions one is led to derive the
conditions for the convergence to the new steady state, Hicks (1970, 1973)
devised his neo-Austrian theory of capital in order to consider a process
that begins and concludes in an out-of equilibrium position. The economy
is conceived as a population of plans of action whose sole common feature is
the existence of one period at least (the first one) in which a new plan can
yield no immediate result: during its gestation lag, a plan generates nothing
more than anticipations (sunk cost). As it happens, the whole sense of the
role of the neo-Austrian approach within the framework of the continuation
theory is encapsulated in a fragment of the Theory of Wages :
When a market is not in equilibrium, costs of transference cannot be
spread over an indefinite period. Even if it is certain that the change
will be a change for the better, it is not certain (and indeed it is
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highly improbable) that the new position will long continue to be the
best attainable. It would be highly imprudent to change unless the
cost of changing would be covered by the gain within quite a brief
period. Costs of change, therefore, become a vastly more important
influence on action than they would be under conditions of stationary
equilibrium. (Hicks 1932, p. 59)
Such an influence, while is being reverberated beyond the single pe-
riod, is a fundamental trait in ‘the study of the Impulse that an innovation
gives’. Such an impulse is primarily a matter of wealth-e↵ects associated
to the sunk costs of decisions based on new expectations and plans. As
it happens, always such decisions involve conjecture about the extent to
which future learning episodes (and relative wealth-e↵ects) can, within the
planning span, a↵ect their course. That a plan viability is therefore what a
liquidity-constrained agent is compelled to be essentially interested in4 is the
reason why Hicks called his out-of-equilibrium approach ‘the Continuation
theory’.
3 Out-of-equilibrium: basics
In a private conversation I had with him several years ago, Mario Amendola
complained about the very title of his first book with Jean-Luc Ga↵ard,
where their out-of-equilibrium model was first exposed. The Innovative
Choice, he observed, evokes a distorted image of its substance. An extract
of that book encases both the model theme and a hint at the reason of his
discontent with that title:
The way in which the economy actually functions, embodied in the
existing productive capacity, depends on the skill of human resources
which reflect the characteristics of the environment. A modification
of the environment as a source of technology is then the outcome of a
learning process which changes the characteristics of human resources,
and can only come about as the result of an innovative choice that
triggers o↵ a process of innovation interpreted as a sequential process
of research and experimentation. In such a context, which is funda-
mentally uncertain, the idea of a choice between given alternatives
whose outcome is more or less known is meaningless. (Amendola and
Ga↵ard 1988, p. 84,my it.)
In isoquant-based production theory, the technique is implied in the pro-
duction function, i.e., in the isoquant itself, which is a relation of a given
output with a gamut of inputs. Given endowments, the set of possible pro-
duction options (the optimal one among them) is simultaneously determined
4He/she is always facing ‘the double problem: on the one hand he must estimate what
the course of demand will be [i.e., learning], and on the other he must correct the excesses
and deficiencies of stock that result from past mistakes [i.e., planning]’ (Hicks 1965, p. 95).
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and the solution to all economic problems is reduced to a question of inter-
temporal substitution. If one aims at allowing for the liquidity constraints
imposed by fixed capital and other ‘frictions’ alike, a short- vs. long-term
equilibrium approach a` la Marshall is generally involved. Needless to say,
uncertainty/learning management and hence liquidity risk management are
not far-reaching questions. Yet, the fact that inputs (expenditure) actu-
ally precede outputs (receipts) implies that an attempt at empowering the
capital structure is not a mere input-substitution question: at the core of
Hicks’ neo-Austrian theory of capital lays the fact that innovation implies
a distortion in that structure—at least temporarily, costs grow more than
proceeds.
Hicks’ most relevant theoretical contribution in continuation theory was
the first formal demonstration ever of the condition for a machinery e↵ect5
a` la Ricardo to take place (Hicks 1970). In that article, Hicks also exposes
for the first time his neo-Austrian theory especially devoted to innovation
analysis. This was based on the sole relation that can be always established
in a passage from old to new capital goods: the one between a capacity to
produce final output and its cost. Theoretically speaking, indeed, no physi-
cal specification of any capital good is involved (Hicks 1977, p. 193). Via a
generalization of Hicks’ assumption about the time profile of a production
process, Amendola (1972) and Patriarca (2012) show that a Ricardo e↵ect
does not rely on the technological properties of a new technique but, more
simply, on the mere construction of new capacity.
Amendola and Ga↵ard (1988) have managed to drop another far reach-
ing assumption by Hicks: the Full Performance hypothesis. This is no less
than a perfect knowledge assumption, which a definitely unconstitutional
norm in continuation theory. By giving this up, learning and planning can
be joined; the most often, Hicks kept them apart in monetary and capital
writings respectively. In the out-of-equilibrium model, decisions about the
level of idle balances (financial reserves) to hold are of critical importance.
While absent in his neo-Austrian writings, such a junction of liquidity man-
agement and the neo-Austrian capital theory was given by Hicks (1990)
a determining role in his suggestion for unifying the two main threads in
macroeconomic thinking, namely the Smithian and the Keynesian—within
which consumption and investment are characteristically regarded as anti-
thetical or transposable elements of demand respectively. The key to Hicks’
proposed unification is the possibility of drawing on reserves as soon as a
distortion in the capital structure occurs.
Finance is not the only limit to innovation, yet. Under the full per-
formance hypothesis, or any other equilibrium assumption in the sphere
5The machinery e↵ect consists in the appearance of temporary unemployment as a
result of shortage of capital (higher construction costs without savings to cover them)
following a technological change.
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of production, innovation consists in the adoption of a new yet well-defined
transformation scheme of inputs into outputs. Basically, the problem of such
an adoption is reduced to a ‘game’, that is a choice set with pre-determined
results, the optimal one among them. From an analytical standpoint, inno-
vation is instantaneously accomplished, so that dynamic e ciency appears
to rely on labour being fully available for new allocations, i.e., on ‘qualita-
tively undecided’ skills. Yet, as emphasized by Adam Smith in chapter 1 of
modern economic theory, technical progress actually relies on specialization,
a qualitative deepening, capabilities being increasingly less available for re-
allocation. As it happens, for any attempt at innovation to be successful
an appropriate learning process must actually take place. On theoretical
grounds, for innovation to be deemed a learning process – so that its re-
sults are not pre-determined but defined step by step, as the sequence of
decisions and learning actually unfolds – it is necessary to consider both the
sunk costs of machine building and labour learning: an attempt at change
(innovation) is constrained not only by available finance but also available
learning capabilities (Amendola 984a).
Out-of-equilibrium, the technique cannot be deemed a well-defined trans-
formation scheme of inputs into outputs; rather, it is a learning capability, a
heterogeneous, particular, specific human resource: ‘the expression of a po-
tential capacity to manage the change’ (Amendola and Ga↵ard 1988, p. 64)
that ‘contributes [in interaction with other ‘techniques’] to determine the
character and the direction of the change and is itself changed as the pro-
cess goes on’ (Amendola 984b, p. 364). The evolution of a learning capability
is paused only during the period after which this is perfectly co-ordinated
with the other techniques—i.e., in equilibrium. Out-of-equilibrium, instead,
the technique reorganizes itself. Considering the role of sunk costs, idle
balances (liquidity risk) and learning altogether,
We can therefore interpret the increase in the demand for liquid po-
sitions that immediately follows the breaking of a sequence [i.e., a
disequilibrium] as the behaviour of an agent who, while having doubts
on the existing model (i.e. on the way the economy is working), is not
yet fully convinced that the model must be discarded and replaced by
something new and completely di↵erent [learning by waiting]. When
(and if) such a conviction is reached, the adequate response to the
search for flexibility . . . can be but an innovative choice [learning
by doing], and the most important problem then becomes that of the
viability of such a choice, strictly related to the determinants of the
evolution of the process of innovation. (Amendola and Ga↵ard 1988,
p. 43
Out-of-equilibrium, constraints associated to the sunk costs of learning
and planning are of paramount importance. Since such costs can be covered
only in following periods, the idea of a succession of ‘choices between given
alternatives’ must be abandoned: the fundamental uncertainty associated
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to the fact that a policy outcome is sequentially determined implies that a
sequence of maximizing choices can result in a substantial accumulation of
liquidity risk and hence in bankruptcy. In order to keep sunk costs asso-
ciated to frequent planning updates at arm’s length, businessmen’s actual
decisional principle is the viability of a plan, instead. As a business needs
be governed within limits expected to demarcate a safety zone6, the out-of-
equilibrium model investigates how, and under what conditions, an intended
process of change – whose viability is secured through a sequence of choices
essentially aiming at relaxing both the human the financial constraint – can
be accomplished.
4 Out-of-equilibrium: policy-making
A plan viability conditions do not only depend on individual sunk costs,
though. An innovation calls for an adequate amount of internal and ex-
ternal financial resources to cover the sunk costs associated to the distor-
tion in productive capacity; no less essential, however, are future financial
resources, namely consumers’ spending: an innovation that eventually gen-
erates its own financial resources is definitively what a viable innovation is
meant to be. Therefore, an entrepreneur cannot a↵ord considering the en-
vironment as a merely exogenous variable: a new technique needs adjusting
to the technology, just as this can be modified by the introduction of a new
technique. Out of equilibrium, there is no wall to divide the technique and
the technology, the firm and the market, the micro and the macro: in a
nutshell, learning is macro-founded.
As it happens, innovation consists in a learning process that modifies
both technique and technology. An innovation is viable if, and only if, a
new coordination among the agents involved is established: an innovator
has to succeed in harmonizing the flow of monetary funds in a direction
that is consistent with the establishment of a new convenient order. The
coordination of producers and consumers’ learning is the kernel of a viable
innovation.
In this context, market competition is to be interpreted a` la Hayek,
namely as a behaviour that lays new information on the market. Innovation,
namely a distortion and a subsequent attempt at harmonizing productive
capacity, is an outstanding instance of Hayekian competition. This can be
more or less e↵ective; not, as is the case with Walrasian competition (the
mainstream perspective on competition), more or less perfect. Whereas
Hayekian competition relates to market behaviour, Walrasian competition
relates to a market situation in which all incentives to rivalry are exhausted.
Such an irenical perspective on competition is condensed into a price vector
6Interestingly, the management of means within the limits imposed by an end is what
Aristotle means by ‘natural chrematistics’.
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resulting in an e cient allocation; in the Hayekian perspective, prices must
be knocked o↵ that pedestal: prices are an instrument, not the sole possible,
to make an innovation viable. As in fixprice a` la Hicks, price changes consist
in acts of policy, i.e., in coordination measures; not, as in the mainstream
view, in a coordination (equilibrium) condition.
Sunk costs, competition and coordination constitute the context within
which fixprice behaviour is to be understood. It is only when sunk costs
are irrelevant, that is when liquidity constraints are irrelevant, that Wal-
rasian competition and its full-coordination hypothesis can be pertinent. In
presence of liquidity constraints, the price-mechanism is liable to be much
less e cient. For example, sunk costs undermine the influence of the in-
terest rate on investment decisions. As it happens, the bank rate a↵ects
only the time taken by an entrepreneur’s investment to pay for itself (Hicks
1989). In its turn, the (liquidity-constrained) lender is concerned not only
with profits, but also – and more fundamentally – with the liquidity risk
implicit in his/her loans. Actually, the interest charged on borrowers is such
that a lender’s liquidity risk is somehow reduced through a suitable mix
of currently available liquidity and future profits. As a rule, coordination
cannot be assured by the impersonal mediation of the price-mechanism: due
to liquidity constraints, too often substitution e↵ect are weak as opposed to
the income and wealth e↵ects implied by the liquidity risk implicit in sunk
costs7.
Out of equilibrium, liquidity risk management and hence money are theo-
retically and analytically essential. As is widely understood, in equilibrium-
based theories the role that is played by liquidity risk is not basic. Out
of equilibrium, money is not a veil: available liquidity plays a key role in
the determination of the eventual outcome of an attempt at change. Being
logically unthinkable ex ante, alleged ‘natural’ values (prices, interest rates,
unemployment, output. . . ) are of no analytical value: natural values are
thinkable only ex post. . . when they are politically8 useless. In the out-of-
equilibrium perspective, all future outcome is endogenous, determined by
the actual steps by way of which coordination is sequentially found, or lost,
track of. Out of equilibrium, the only exogenous parameters are past out-
comes: an out-of-equilibrium sequence is analytically irreversible, indeed.
This is not the case with an equilibrium-based analytical perspective on
change.
A ready comparison with the principles of mainstream macro-economic
thinking is here worthwhile9. Its paradigm is ‘growth’, interpreted as the
long-term potential output (full performance): in such a long run, con-
sumption and production are mutually consistent and hence in equilibrium
7‘[O]ne needs to pay little attention to interest rates, changes in which emerge as
consequences of changes in liquidity’ (Hicks 1977, p. 79).
8In the sense of Hayekian competition.
9For a thorough comparison see Amendola and Ga↵ard (2006).
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(full coordination). The cycle is due to coordination failures (disequilibria)
arising out of bad prices (cf. Walrasian competition) ascribed to market
frictions. Market deregulation (lack of frictions, or rigidities) and capital
productivity10 are thus the ‘fundamentals’ (fundamental parameters) of the
competitiveness of an economic system. Endogenous growth theory allows
for a third fundamental, namely agents’ preferences about technical progress.
In doing so, agents’ behaviour can be given an axiomatic foundation: given
rational expectations, all the time agents inter-temporally optimize their
(pre-determined) choices outcomes. This third fundamental makes equilib-
rium a condition an economic system all the time does stick to11.
However growth is considered, exogenous or endogenous, growth is de-
termined by capital productivity, in a one-way relation. That the oppo-
site never applies is an implicit equilibrium assumption in the production
domain: coordination issues do never arise, as if new productive capacity
could be made instantaneously, namely as if all costs were here and now
(analytically) covered by proceeds, so that liquidity risk associated to ca-
pacity building (both in the machine and the learning sense) seems to be
of no rational consequence. Failing liquidity risk, fluctuations are deemed
reversible, and economic change a-sequential: in methodological parlance,
economic dynamics is disengaged from the irreversible character of histori-
cal time. In such an artificial environment, it is natural to believe that the
seeds of liquidity risk are sown by frictions (whose abatement is the task of
so-called structural reforms12) and not, as it actually is, by the sunk costs
of learning and capacity building.
Coordination relying on mutually consistent learning, the intensity at
which relative measures unfold—that is competition intensity, is not a neu-
tral coordination factor. Outcomes being sequentially determined, excessive
price volatility shows up as a symptom of substantial uncertainty. As it
happens, policies must aimed at learning a new form of coordination, i.e.,
10Implicit in the production function, productivity of capital is an index of the techno-
logical frontier.
11New-Keynesian ‘rigidities’ can determine deviations from the equilibrium (natural)
fluctuations as defined in New-Classical RBC models.
12As it happens, Keynesian and Monetarist policy views share a common interpretation
of change as an ‘instability’ (mismatch of supply and demand for final output) so that, in
both cases, economic policy is a ‘stabilization policy’. In a Keynesian world, the e↵ect of
a final demand constraint is a disinvestment which entails a more than proportional (‘ac-
celerated’) recession, which is to cause a further regression of the final demand constraint
and so on, in a vicious circle that can only be stopped with an injection of exogenous de-
mand. In a Monetarist world, instead, instability has always and everywhere a monetary
origin because, Keynesian uncertainty not subsisting in demanding final output,
output prices basically depend on money supply. As a ‘wrong’ money supply results in
‘wrong’ prices, best policy is no (discretionary) monetary policy (Lucas 1975), i.e., mere
inflation-targeting. Likewise, the natural (structural) levels of output and unemployment
constituting a first best, fiscal policy has just to set the seal on structural reforms, so that
agents can behave according to fundamentals only.
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at adapting organization to new relevant knowledge. All such policies are
always instruments, never an end in itself: as with prices or market struc-
tures, there is no organizational norm and, more generally, no coordination
measure that can ex ante be deemed per se (i.e., always and everywhere)
‘optimal’. The only relevant objective is a convenient coordination, which is
to be attained via a sequence of constrained and constraining coordination
measures.
A guiding principle in mutual learning coordination managing can be
identified, though: the need to relax the human and financial constraints
underlying sunk costs. Such costs implying a rise in liquidity risk, the avail-
ability of reserves to manage such a risk is of paramount importance. From
a policy perspective, the main function of money is buying others’ collabora-
tion. In this sense, a viable competition intensity shall be a positive function
of available liquidity (i.e., gradualism is better than shock therapies) and,
in an attempt at generalization, it could be maintained that – provided that
appropriate learning sequentially materializes – viability requirements are
the less stringent the less stringent liquidity constraints are.
5 The out-of-equilibrium model: an accounting
perspective
Amendola and Ga↵ard’s (1988, 1998, 2006) analytical model is based on a
system of interacting behavioural equations by way of which what happens
on the way of an out-of-equilibrium process of change can be simulated.
In the model characteristic ex ante perspective, such simulations are not
meant to generate ready-cooked solutions to the policy problem, but to assist
the policy-maker in weighting and considering the impact of a hypothetical
policy intervention on the human and financial imbalances characterizing
a process of change driven by learning-by-doing. A policy intervention to
exert a dampening e↵ect on such imbalances shall play a positive role for
the viability of such a process.
These pages aim at approaching the out-of-equilibrium model from a
new standpoint: its accounting structure. The sequence of accounts implicit
in the model allows drawing not only a schematic synopsis of Amendola
and Ga↵ard’s sequential model itself (whose original notation is accordingly
preserved), but lays the groundwork for practical policy application, too.
That is why ESA2010 (Eurostat 2013) accounting codes13 are attached to the
relevant items. As observed in Sec. 1, EU cohesion policy introduces ex ante
13AF.2, stock of currency and deposits; AF.4, stock of loans; AN.122, stock of work in
progress; AN.123, stock of finished goods; B.10, changes in net worth; B.90, net worth;
F.2, transactions in currency and deposits; F.4, loans; D.42, distributed income from
corporations; P.11, transactions in market output. P.2, intermediate consumption—in
the neo-Austrian perspective on capital (as opposed to the Walrasian one with which the
ESA is essentially concerned with), this includes compensation of employees (D.1); as a
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and interim impact evaluations. These are especially meant to highlight the
policy intervention ex ante logic so to go beyond the ex post, counterfactual
slant characterizing the classical econometric approach to policy evaluation.
The consequential slant of the out-of-equilibrium model can play a positive
role in maturing an ex ante approach to policy evaluation.
The out-of-equilibrium model assumes a monetary economy with a sin-
gle financial asset (money). Focus is on the interactions between producers
(firms, S.11) and consumers (households, S.14) of non-financial goods and
services, although the possibility of financial support (ft) by a third party
is explicitly allowed for. The overall object of analysis, namely a process of
change, consists in a sequence of elemental periods. These, in their turn,
consist in a sequence of decisions by means of which producers and con-
sumers interact. In the simplification here proposed, the ‘period’ is made
up of two ‘episodes’: the former focuses on producers’ decisions, the latter
on consumers’ decisions.
As for producers, it is here assumed that a production plan lasts two
periods. Capacity that is created now can only be utilized in the subsequent
period: (!ct ,!
u
t+1;B
c
t , B
u
t+1), with B
u
t+1 6 Bct ; !ct and !ut+1 are monetary
wage funds (capital), i.e., respectively, the cost to build and exploit a pro-
ductive capacity of But+1 unities of final output. In other words, while current
output resulting from Bct is always nil, !
c
t is the monetary anticipation re-
quired to be in a position to produce, in the next period, But+1 unities of
final output. Of course, omegas constitute households’ labour income.
The period t starts (LS) with producers and consumers endowed with a
given amount of monetary and non-monetary resources inherited from the
previous period. Households, whose role is to finance consumption plans
lasting one period, dispose of a certain amount hht 1 of idle balances. Firms,
whose role is to finance production plans lasting two periods, dispose of
a stock Mt of internal monetary resources – amounting to the sum of the
proceeds from final output sales in the previous period (mt 1) and residual
reserves (hft 1) – and a stock of non-monetary resources, namely finished
goods (ot 1) and usable capacity (Bt 1) valued at past output prices (pt 1).
A certain degree of liquidity risk is implicit in this non-monetary stock.
Let us now pass to consider the course of interaction. The period is thus
split into two ‘episodes’: producers accomplish their sequence of decisions in
the former episode; households in the latter. Producers start by making a
purely distributive decision14 concerning the portion of Mt that is taken out
to finance non-production plans (ct). In the present setting, such a take-out
consequence, productive capacity is considered as P.52, i.e., as a change in inventories;
P.3 is final consumption expenditure (no corresponding asset is recorded as, for sake of
simplicity, consumption is here supposed to take place within the period).
14It should be noted that in earlier versions of the model this distributive decision did
not come first. The correction adopted in Amendola and Ga↵ard 2006 is analytically to
the point and allows important accounting simplifications, too.
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can only finance be destined to households’ consumption plans. The whole
of what remains (Mt   ct) goes to finance production plans. Yet, financing
production plans implies something more than mere putting money into
‘inputs’: a certain portion (⇢) of idle balances must be hold as a reserve
fund being available should downward risks on the plan materialize.
The desired amount of a reserve fund hf,dt [= ⇢ (Mt   ct + ft)] depends
on a producer’s conjecture about the prospect uncertainty. Basically, such
a conjecture depends on his/her plans, namely the amount of capacity the
producer aims at consuming (utilizing) or creating anew. Such an amount,
in its turn, depends not only on the costs of inputs (wage fund, !t) but
also on a conjecture about the state and possible evolution in final demand
(dt), which in its turn contributes to determine the selling price (pt), the
producer’ capacity to borrow (ft), and his/her acceptance of the price it
to pay for external finance (footnote 21). Such a complex determination of
desired reserves, investment, disinvestment, indebtedness, terms of trading
(and something more that here is not considered for sake of simplicity15)
reflects the complexity of an entrepreneur’s decisional problem.
15For example, it is here assumed that firms are not constrained by available human
resources, which is a simplification hiding important qualities of the model. It is here also
assumed that the desired level in the finished product stock is zero: that is why current
supply (st) here amounts to the sum of current output (qt) and the existing stock of
finished product (ot 1).
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In the first episode (LX.1), firms originate these liabilities16: ct, h
f,d
t ,
ft(1+ it) and !t. These are corresponded by a pool of firms’ assets17 – made
up of current output (ptqt) and capacity under construction (ptBct ) to which
disinvestment associated to capacity utilization (ptBut ) is to be subtracted
– and a pool of households’ assets (ct + !t). At the end of this episode,
firms and households’ balance-sheets assume an interim configuration that
is quite instructive: since hf,dt +!t = Mt ct+ft, producers’ interim net worth
(B.90) amounts to the sum of all illiquid (AF.4) items values. On the other
side, households’ interim net worth amounts to the sum of the values of all
liquid (AF.2) items available in the system. As it happens, entrepreneurial
decisions consist in a value transformation process associated to a liquidity
transformation process, so that value is created if and only if the increase in
liquidity risk associated to the sunk costs is so managed as to be temporary18.
In the second episode (LX.2), households must decide about their con-
sumption plans (dt) and the degree of confidence (h
f,d
t ) with which carrying
them on19. Final consumption expenditure is determined by the e↵ective
demand principle: if demand exceeds supply (footnote 15) households are
left with a stock of undesired idle balances (khh,nt k)20; otherwise, firms are
left with an undesired stock of finished product (kptotk). At this point, firms
reimburse debt and everyone withdraws the unused parts of reserve funds.
During this episode, liquidity moves the other way round: at the end, firms
are more liquid, households less liquid.
Under such a set of assumptions, firms’ and households’ closing balance
sheets (LE) are perfectly analogous to opening ones. The model that is
here set out has many simplifications relative to Amendola and Ga↵ard’s
model. Most notably, the human resource constraint on the wage fund is not
allowed for: although such a shortcut hides important features of the model,
it seems to be quite consistent with current policy issues, in which financial
constraints appear generally stronger than human constraints. Secondly,
no explicit a rule governing market-determined price and wage changes is
considered. Be it as it may – apart from a deceiving provision for the price
to pay for external finance21 – the accounting model here devised yields
16It is characteristic of the ‘endogenous money’ approach to banking theory, as opposed
to the ‘exogenous money’ approach, the view that economic units can only ‘originate’
liabilities (Bianco 015b).
17Nominal holding gains and losses (K.7) relative to ot 1 and Bt 1 are here not explicitly
di↵erentiated.
18This point should be referred to Bianco (015b), in which both traditional banking and
shadow-banking (‘creative’) are interpreted as liquidity transformation processes, i.e., as
originate-to-hold (OTH) vs. originate-to-distribute (OTD) models of idiosyncratic liquid-
ity risk management.
19In the original model, dt = (1   )Mht and hh,dt =  Mht .
20The double bar notation is to stress that such a stock exists only if greater than zero.
21If a financial sector is to be allowed for, what is to be taken into account is not the
interest rate charged on a borrower’s asset of ft but the discount rate on a borrower’s
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a simplified yet consistent accounting image of Amendola and Ga↵ard’s
sequential model.
6 Conclusion
The theoretical mainstream looks at learning in an ex post perspective only.
The attempt at escape from paradox in the resulting theory of change was
a key trait of economics during so-called ‘years of high-theory’ (from the
Great Depression until WW2). Abundant pleas for a ‘higher’, namely more
prudential theory, have characterized debate following the Great Financial
Crisis, too. In this context, rational expectations hypothesis is a typical
target of criticism. Under such an assumptions, agents’ errors are deemed
random, i.e., unmeaning, so that plans are never worth a revision. In other
words, the sunk costs of changing expectations and plans are assumed away.
An adaptive expectations hypothesis, however, appears to be no more than
the other side of the same coin: when no provisional error is unmeaning (all
learning is shocking), sunk costs of changing expectations and plans are de
facto assumed away, too. Rational expectations can be regarded as a more
fundamentalist version of the same ‘iso-quantistic’ inspiration.
Conventional policy narration before the crisis rather assumed rational
expectations. In the consensus view, learning in the private sector was un-
meaning, financial operations just a veil; each and every problem arose out
of a lack of information or attempts at electoral cheating by the public sec-
tor. Yet, one of the most severe financial crisis ever did happen after years
of unquestioned application of policy principles in tune with that narration.
Such policies have produced little more than a feeble real growth accom-
panied by an extraordinary expansion in shadow banking. The European
Central Bank, while having to be unconcerned (‘autonomous’) with the real
economy, can well plan action (jointly with the Bank of England) to repair
the securitization market (BOE and ECB 2014).
Yet, a sound theory of securitization was, and still is, unavailable (Gorton
and Metrick 2012). Such a privation must be a reflection of the phenom-
ena detailed by Pagano (2014), namely the ine↵ectiveness, and consequent
poor or perverse impacts, of stereotyped theoretical models and policy inter-
ventions. Building on ‘endogenous money’ views, I have elsewhere devised
an interpretation of both traditional and shadow banking as distinct proce-
dures of idiosyncratic liquidity risk management with equilibrium conditions
giving place to viability conditions (Bianco 015b).
Ex ante impact evaluations call for a theory of change. It is one of
Amendola’s key teachings that any such a theory is to be derived follow-
ing a sequential, out-of-equilibrium approach. All equilibrium theory, be-
ing based on a coordination assumption, is prevented from displaying any
liability of ft.
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heuristic power as a theory of change: its function can be no more than
definitional, namely with the model way to arrange existing information.
The accounting version of his model here presented emphasizes the liquid-
ity risk dimension in Amendola’s theory of change. I deem this a first step
towards a macro-financial out-of-equilibrium model. Reference to o cial
codes in institutional accounting is to be considered as a hint at the verifica-
tion of both data per se and the consistency of accounting definitions under
the input-output framework (with which o cial accounts are especially con-
cerned with) and the out-of-equilibrium approach.
The sequence of two episodes here devised highlights the coordination
issues that characterize a single period in an out-of-equilibrium sequence.
Two of such issues here arise: one between investment (construction) and
disinvestment (utilization), another between disinvestment and consump-
tion. In the former episode, firms’ learning constraint is relaxed while the
financial constraint is strengthened; vice versa in the latter episode. Moving
constraints reflect liquidity shifts between institutional sectors. Changes in
reserve funds are evidence of learning, which is the fundamental driver of
change.
As for learning analysis, it should be considered a recent legal standard,
namely that all reserve funds must have a determined nature: explicit ref-
erence to those activities whose risks are granted by any of such a fund is
mandatory. Taking this standard into consideration implies that households
and firms’ reserve funds are divided into two parts, so that single out reserve
funds devoted to manage downward risks, and cover associated sunk costs,
pending on running and new plans respectively. Consistently with the esprit
des lois in EU cohesion policy, such a distinction can lay the groundwork
for monitoring and evaluating the learning dimension of cohesion policy out-
comes.
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